Liquid democracy allows an agent to either vote directly over the available alternatives (candidates) of an election, or to delegate her voting rights to another agent (her guru) who can then vote on her behalf. In the academic literature and industrial applications of liquid democracy, each agent is usually allowed to nominate only one guru per election. However, if the nominated guru does not participate in the election, then the votes delegated to this guru will be wasted. To minimise the possibility of wasted votes, each agent can declare a personal ranking over her most desirable gurus, e.g, as in GoogleVotes. In this paper, we show that even if personal rankings over gurus are declared, the common delegation method of liquid democracy (which we call Depth First Delegation) remains problematic. More specifically, we show that if personal rankings over gurus are declared under the Depth First Delegation rule, there can be gurus who become worst off by receiving a delegated vote. To solve this issue, firstly we introduce a general framework for voting systems that allow delegation of voting rights. The key feature of this framework is the delegation rule function, which when instantiated details who receives each delegated vote. Secondly, we propose a delegation rule function instantiation that we call Breadth First Delegation. Given that personal rankings over gurus are declared, this is the first rule where every agent weakly prefers receiving a delegated vote.
Introduction
Liquid democracy is a middle ground between direct and representative democracy, as it allows each member of the electorate to vote directly on a topic or temporarily delegate their vote to someone else. If a vote is delegated, the agent who casts the delegated vote becomes known as a guru (Christoff and Grossi 2017) . Therefore individuals who are apathetic for an election, or who trust in the knowledge of another member of the electorate more than their own, can still have an impact on an election through their guru. Note that proxy voting (see Miller 1969) also allows vote delegation but, unlike liquid democracy, proxy voting only allows a vote to be delegated a single time before reaching a guru.
Liquid democracy has been gaining popularity in a few domains recently, which we will now discuss to give the reader a general overview of the non theoretical developments. In the political domain, local parties have been ex-*This is a draft document. perimenting with it, such as the Partenpartei in Germany, Demoex in Sweden and the Net Party in Argentina. Additionally, the councils of London Southwark, Turino, and San Dona di Piave are also working towards the integration of liquid democracy for some of their community engagement processes, through the Horizon 2020 project: WeGovNow (Boella et al. 2018) .
In the technology domain, LiquidFeedback is a popular online platform (Behrens et al. 2014; Kling et al. 2015) , where a user can select a single guru at the topic, area or national level. Another prominent example of online liquid democracy is GoogleVotes (Hardt and Lopes 2015) , which was run as a three year internal trial mostly centered around voting over different catering options. GoogleVotes allowed delegation advertisements to be made through the Google+ corporate network, where each member of the electorate could select multiple desired gurus organised into an ordered ranking 1 .
Liquid democracy has also been gaining increased attention within the blockchain domain. Blockchain is a technology where data transactions are grouped into blocks and the blocks are cryptographically linked into a chain. This blockchain is replicated in each node of the network, where a consensus protocol makes sure that every node (eventually) has the same copy of the data in the same order. It is due to this data replication that gives blockchain a significant advantage over traditional client-server architecture models for running an online liquid democracy system. With a centralised server, you have to trust that the server will delegate your vote to the correct guru, but if you are running a node of the blockchain network you will be able to check yourself that your vote has been given to the correct guru. Blockchain organisations who are providing liquid democracy based tools, include: the Ethereum Foundation for decentralised autonomous organisations (see the liquid democ-1 In GoogleVotes, delegation was computed using what they describe as back-track Breadth First Search. This is not equal to our proposed Breadth First Delegation rule. We know this, as the example shown in the Tally/Coverage section of Hardt 2014 (at 32 :00m) chooses the delegation chain F, E, C but our Breadth First Delegation rule would choose the chain F, A . We cannot say for sure that GoogleVotes' back track Breadth First Search is equivalent to the Depth First Delegation rule discussed in this paper because there is no publicly available formal model. racy section of EthereumFoundation 2018); Swarm Fund for democratic investments (see Section 2.1 of SwarmFund 2018); and Democracy Earth for decentralised governance (see Section 2 of DemocracyEarth 2017).
Regardless of the increasing interest in liquid democracy, there remains outstanding theoretical issues. Firstly, there is currently no general liquid democracy formalism (i.e. see the multiple different formal definitions of liquid democracy in: Brill and Talmon 2018; Christoff and Grossi 2017; Kahng, Mackenzie, and Procaccia 2018;...). This is unlike non-liquid democracy voting systems that share the voting rule function formalisation. Secondly, there is no consensus on how to handle liquid democracy systems with multiple nominated gurus (Brill 2018) . Therefore the contribution of this paper seeks to tackle both of these issues by:
(a) Detailing a general formal framework for delegation rules that can take as input information on the abstaining, delegating and vote casting agents, and outputs which guru receives each delegated vote.
(b) Showing that the classical liquid democracy delegation rule, which we name as Depth First Delegation (DFD), cannot guarantee that gurus weakly prefer receiving a delegated vote (when agents can declare a preference order over gurus).
(c) Introducing the Breadth First Delegation (BFD) rule, which we prove guarantees that gurus weakly prefer receiving delegated votes.
Contribution (a) provides a general liquid democracy formalism that can operate with any delegation rule combined with any voting rule. Contributions (b) and (c) focus on the incentive of gurus to receive delegated votes. Incentivising gurus to receive delegated votes is a basic requirement of liquid democracy, as without gurus accepting votes we effectively move to a direct democracy model. Note that BFD and DFD place the same requirements on each agent, to either: (i) declare a preference order over the election alternatives (cast your vote); (ii) declare a preference order over the potential gurus (delegate your vote); or (iii) declare neither (abstain). Our paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 introduces the formal model of our liquid democracy system. Section 3 defines two instantiations of delegation rule functions and gives associated examples. Section 4 details our proofs, while Section 5 outlines related work and concludes.
Preliminaries
Consider a set of voters V = {1, . . . , n} and a set of alternatives or outcomes A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . a p }. We detail the set of electorates using E(V) := 2 V \{∅}, i.e. non-empty subsets of V. In our model, for every election there are three sets of
where set V a consists of the agents who abstain, set V c consists of the agents who directly cast a vote, and set V d consists of agents who are willing to delegate their vote to members of V c .
A preference relation over alternatives for agent i ∈ V is denoted A i and is a binary relation on A, where we write a x A i a y to mean agent i strictly prefers alternative a x over alternative a y . A preference relation over alternatives is:
• Complete -i.e. for all a x , a y ∈ A, either a x A i a y or a y A i a x holds;
• Antisymmetric -i.e. for all a x , a y ∈ A, if a x A i a y holds then this implies a y A i a x does not hold; and • Transitive -i.e. for all a x , a y , a z ∈ A, then if a x A i a y and a y A i a z hold, this implies a x A i a z also holds. The set of all preference relations over alternatives is denoted by P A . As our model also allows votes to be delegated to gurus, we introduce a strict preference relation over gurus that is an incomplete, antisymmetric and transitive binary relation on V. The preference order over gurus needs is strict so that cycles can be resolved, and incomplete as for many election settings it is unrealistic to assume that all the agents are aware of who every potential voter is. The preference relation over gurus for agent i is denoted by V i , and must not include herself (to avoid cycles), i.e. if x or y equals i, then x V i y does not hold. In a slight abuse of notation, we allow the rank of the gurus of i to be accessed by indexing, so the most preferred guru of i will be V i,1 , while the least preferred guru of i will be V i,| V i | . Lastly, the set of all preference relations over gurus is denoted by P V . Now building on the formalism detailed in Brandt, Geist, and Peters (2016), we can define related functions. A preference profile over alternatives R A is a function from a non empty electorate N ∈ E(V) to the set of preference relations over alternatives P A . Whereas, a preference profile over gurus R V is a function from a non electorate N ∈ E(V) to the set of preference relations over gurus P V . The set of all preference profiles over alternatives is given by P A,E(V) , while the set of all preference profiles over gurus is given by
When adding or removing preference relations over alternatives, we will use the following notation. For an preference profile over alternatives
} Additionally, when adding or deleting preference relations over gurus, we will use the following notation. For a preference profile over gurus
We will conclude this section by discussing how the agents are assigned to the V a , V c and V d electorates given the preference profiles R A and R V . If (i, A i ) ∈ R A , then it is inferred that agent i will cast a vote according to A i and will therefore be a member of the casting electorate i ∈ V c . If (i, A i ) / ∈ R A , then i will be a member of the delegating
Otherwise, i will be a member of the abstaining electorate 3 (i.e. i ∈ V a ). Note that the vote of an agent j ∈ V d in the delegating electorate may not be used in the election, as an appropriate guru may not be found for j according to the delegation rule function being used, formally described later in Definition 3.
Preliminary Delegation Definitions
To model the delegation connections between the voters, we will organise them into a graph:
• V is the set of nodes representing the agents registered as voters; • E is the set of directed edges representing the delegation connections between voters; and • w is the weight function w : E → N that assigns a value to an edge (i, j) equal to i's preference ranking of j.
Example 1. See Figure 1 and Figure 2 for delegation graph examples, which will be discussed in more detail later.
To generate a delegation graph, we use the following:
Definition 2. A Delegation Graph Function G takes as input a preference profile over gurus (R V ) and returns the related delegation graph DG = (V, E, w), where the following properties hold:
Now to see which gurus delegated votes are assigned to, we use the following:
Definition 3. A Delegation Rule Function D takes as input a preference profile over alternatives (R A ) as well as a delegation graph (DG), and returns another preference profile over alternativesR A that incorporates delegations. Function D states that:
• if (i, A i ) ∈R A , then i will be casting her vote. • if (i, A j ) ∈R A and i = j, then i will be delegating her vote to j (j becomes i's guru).
• if (i, A k ) / ∈R A then i will be abstaining.
A delegation rule effectively analyses, for each agent i ∈ V, the sub tree of the delegation graph rooted at i and decides whether i will cast, delegate or abstain. If i is found to delegate, the delegation rule function will traverse i's sub tree (according to the rules of this specific instantiated delegation rule) to find i's guru. Later in the paper, we will discuss delegation rule function examples after we have explicitly defined two in Defn. 8 and Defn. 9.
to delegate. For instance: the voter may be indifferent between the alternatives; the voter may not be confident in her own ranking capability; and/or the voter does not want to invest the resources required to generate an accurate preference relation over alternatives. 3 There are multiple possible reasons why an agent would want to abstain. For instance: the voter may not trust anyone else to vote in her best interest; or the voter may not want to invest the resources required to generate an accurate preference relation over gurus. Now to get the outcome of an election, as in the social choice theory literature we will use a voting rule function F . In our model, F will take as input the modified preference profile over alternativesR A (which incorporates delegations) and will return a single alternative winner or a ranking over the alternatives (depending on which voting rule was used). In Section 3, we show how the result of the voting rule is dependant on the delegation rule chosen. I.e. it may be the case that
Putting our discussion of this section together, we can introduce our model:
which contains a set of possible voters V, a set of possible alternatives A, a preference profile over alternatives R A , a preference profile over gurus R V , a delegation rule D and a voting rule F .
For this paper, the key property that we are investigating is participation. The participation property holds if a voter will not lose out by joining an electorate. Social choice theory defines participation in the context of vote casting only (Fishburn and Brams 1983; Moulin 1988) and does not consider the issue of delegation. Because this paper's model also uses delegation, we now establish two separate definitions of participation (inspired by the participation definition of Brandt, Geist, and Peters 2016).
The first definition, Cast Participation, holds for a voting rule F if each agent i ∈ V weakly prefers joining any possible voting electorate V c (given any possible non conflicting delegating electorate V d ), compared to abstaining 4 . Therefore by voting, agent i will always either: have no affect on the election result; or will change the result for i's benefit. Definition 5. The Cast Participation property holds for a voting rule F iff:
The next definition, Guru Participation, holds for a voting rule F if each vote casting agent (potential guru) i ∈ V weakly prefers receiving a delegated vote from agent j ∈ V compared to not receiving the delegated vote, given any possible voting electorate V c and any possible non conflicting delegating electorate V d . Therefore when i receives j's delegated vote, the election result will either: not change; or will change to i's benefit. Definition 6. The Guru Participation property holds for a voting rule F iff:
We note here that there are other interesting participation properties to be defined and analysed for liquid democracy, such as when an agent moves from the abstain to delegating electorates, or from the delegating to casting electorates. But these are out of scope for this paper, which focuses on finding a delegation rule that incentivises agents to participate as gurus.
Now given the set of all possible voting rules F = {F 1 , F 2 , ..., F x }, it is known from the social choice theory literature that only a subsetF ⊂ F satisfy (cast) participation. For example, in (Fishburn and Brams 1983) , it was shown that the single transferable vote rule does not satisfy (cast) participation, while in (Moulin 1988) it was shown that no Condorcet-consistent voting rule satisfies (cast) participation when there are 25 or more voters.
In this paper we focus our guru participation proofs only on the voting rules inF. We build on the following observation that shows that given a voting rule inF, if an agent j joins the delegating electorate and only guru i gains delegated votes, then guru participation is satisfied: Observation 1. Consider a tuple LD x that contains a voting rule satisfying cast participation (i.e. F ∈F) and this tuple gives a preference profile over alternatives, that incorporates delegations, ofR A = D(R A , G(R V )). Now consider another tuple LD y that is identical to LD x apart from: agent j has joined the delegating electorate from the abstaining electorate,
))); and i has been selected as j's guru, i.e. (j, V i ) ∈R A . If ∀k ∈ V either of the following hold: (a) k's vote is delegated to the same guru in both LD x and LD y (i.e. (k, V l ) ∈R A ∩R A ); or (b) k's vote is delegated to guru i in LD y (i.e. (k, A i ) ∈R A ). then the only alternative(s) that can improve their position in the ranking returned by the voting rule F in LD y , compared to the ranking returned by the voting rule F in LD x , are the preferred alternative(s) of i. In this case, it is weakly preferable for guru i when agent j joins the delegating electorate.
Delegation Rules
The delegation graph provides a way to visualise the connections between each agent according to the preference profile over gurus. Recall that liquid democracy is a form of proxy voting that allows the nominated gurus to also delegate their vote. Therefore if an agent p delegates (p ∈ V d ) then p's vote may be set according to any s ∈ V c in the sub tree of the delegation graph that begins from p. This occurs even if guru s is not actually in p's preference relation over gurus V p , i.e. it is possible that ¬∃x to make V p,x = s hold true. In this case, it must hold that there has been at least one intermediator agent between the original delegator p and the nominated guru s. The possible intermediator agents can be found by inspecting the delegation graph.
To find out exactly which intermediator agents are used between the delegator and the guru, we introduce delegation chains. A delegation chain for an agent p starts with p, ends with s (who would receive p's vote through intermediators), and in-between lists all of the intermediator agents, who have further delegated p's vote. A delegation chain (see Definition 7) must satisfy the following conditions: (i) agent p delegates her vote while guru s casts her vote; (ii) no agent occurs more than once in the chain (to avoid infinite delegation cycles that could otherwise occur); (iii) the intermediator agents must not have cast a vote (as otherwise they would claim p's vote); and (iv) each agent in the delegation chain must be linked to the next agent in the delegation chain through an edge in the delegation graph. Definition 7. Given a Liquid Democracy tuple LD with electorates V c and V d , a Delegation Chain (DC) for an agent p, is an ordered tuple denoted DC(p) = p, q, ..., s , where DC(p) 1 = p, DC(p) 2 = q, ..., DC(p) |DC(p)| = s, and:
We refer to DC(p) d as being depth d of the delegation chain. Also, given a delegation chain DC(p), we allow the weights of each edge of the delegation chain to be accessible using the function w over the delegation chain itself:
. Therefore we can refer to w(DC(p)) d as the weight to move from depth d to depth d + 1 of the delegation chain. If there is an attempt to return the weight at w(DC(p)) f where f ≥ |DC(p)|, then w(DC(p)) f = |V| + 1.
We can use delegation chains to help us understand which guru will be assigned p's vote should p decide to delegate her vote. It is fair to assume that if p's most preferred guru V In Example 2, agent a's vote is given to guru d, but why should d (who is the second preference of b) outrank agent a's explicit second preference e? This question gains even more importance the longer the depth first delegation chain is. Given this issue, we define here a different delegation rule that prioritises an agent's explicit preferences. We define this rule as Breadth First Delegation (BFD), which says that p's vote should be assigned to guru s iff: (i) p delegates 
(a) DC(p) y |DC(p) y | = r; (b) and either:
Example 3. Consider the Delegation Graph displayed in Figure 1 . Using the Breadth First Delegation rule, a's vote will be set by guru e (i.e. (a, A e ) ∈R A ) through the delegation chain DC(a) 1 = a, e . There is one other delegation chain available, DC(a) 2 = a, b, d , but DC(a) 1 is prioritised because |DC(a) 1 | < |DC(a) 2 |, which satisfies (i), (ii), (iii, a) and (iii, b1) of the BFD rule.
Delegation Rules Main Examples
Like voting rules, different delegation rules can have different properties. We will show through the next two examples, using Figure 1 and Figure 2 that the Depth First Delegation rule cannot guarantee guru participation. Note that the numeric election results for both examples are displayed in Table 1.
The first example shows that by only changing the delegation rule function, the result of a liquid democracy game can change: Given the depth first delegation rule D DF D and Example 2 we know that agent a is assigned DC(a) 2 , meaning D DF D returns the preference profile over alternatives:
If instead we use the breadth first delegation rule D BF D , we know from Example 3 that agent a is assigned DC(a) 1 , meaning D BF D returns the preference profile over alternatives:
The second example shows that if c joins the delegating electorate V d and the Depth First Delegation rule D DF D is chosen, the result can be inversed:
Example 5. Consider the Delegation Graph displayed in Figure 2 where the only difference to Figure 1 
This means D DF D returns the preference profile over alternatives:
Given the breadth first delegation rule D BF D , we can see that: agent a prioritises DC(a) 1 because |DC(a) 1 | < |DC(a) 2 | < |DC(a) 3 |; agent b prioritises DC(b) 1 because |DC(b) 1 | < |DC(b) 2 | < |DC(b) 3 |; and agent c prioritises DC(c) 1 because |DC(c) 1 | < |DC(c) 2 | < |DC(c) 3 |. So D BF D returns the preference profile over alternatives:
Delegation Rule Properties
Before continuing, recall that Observation 1 showed how guru participation can be satisfied. Briefly, Observation 1 showed that when a new agent joins the election, if only one guru receives delegated votes (that have possibly been reassigned from other gurus), then the receiving guru will be weakly better off.
The previous examples shows that guru participation may not hold for DFD when there is a cycle in the delegation graph. Because of this cycle, when c joins the election, both gurus d and e receive reassigned delegated votes and so Observation 1 does not occur. We summarise this with the following:
Theorem 1. Given a Liquid Democracy tuple LD with a Depth First Delegation rule D DF D ∈ LD, then guru participation is not guaranteed to hold.
Proof. By example. Take the preference profile over alternatives and the preference profile over gurus from Figure 
V c e. Now see from Example 4, Example 5 and Table 1 that the following does not hold:
It does not hold, as when agent c joins the delegating electorate, the result changes from No to Yes when the Depth First Delegation rule function was used, even though c delegates her vote to guru d (i.e. (c, A d ) ∈ D DF D (R A , G(R V ))) and d votes for No. Therefore, c's guru d became worst off when receiving c's vote, violating the guru participation definition and proving this Theorem.
We also highlight that if the delegation graph has no cycle, then guru participation is guaranteed to hold for Liquid Democracy tuples that contain the Depth First Delegation rule. We show this through the following Theorem, which details that if Observation 1 does not hold, there must be a cycle in the graph.
Theorem 2. Given a Liquid Democracy tuple LD with a Depth First Delegation rule D DF D ∈ LD and no cycle in the delegation graph, then guru participation is guaranteed to hold.
Proof. Assume there is no cycle in the delegation graph and guru participation does not hold. Due to Observation 1, we know that whenever an agent joins the delegating electorate, if only one guru receives delegated votes then guru participation is satisfied. Therefore, for Observation 1 not to hold, when the last agent j joined the delegating electorate to give her vote to guru i, another agent k must have changed its guru to another agent q (q = i). But either: (i) delegation chain k, ..., q existed before j joined, in which case guru q should have been chosen previously if she really was the best guru (and so Observation 1 would hold in this case); or (ii) delegation chain k, ..., j, ..., q is now preferred for k, even though the preferred chain of j is j, ..., i . This can only occur if there is an agent e between k & j and j & i, because Definition 7 states a delegation chain cannot use the same agent twice. But in this case, the assumption will be violated as there would now be a cycle in the graph, i.e. the cycle e, ..., j, ..., e .
For the next proof we introduce the notation DC(i) * y , to stand for the delegation chain used to give agent i's vote to its guru in the liquid democracy tuple LD y . That is, there is no more preferred delegation chain for agent i, given the delegation rule D ∈ LD y .
We have already shown from Theorem 1 that Depth First Delegation does not guarantee guru participation when a cycle is in the delegation graph. We will now prove that Breadth First Delegation does guarantee the guru participation property (with or without a cycle in the delegation graph).
Both our lemmas will be based on LD
The first Lemma considers a situation where an agent k is currently delegating her vote to guru h in LD x . Now if another agent i joins the delegating electorate and i is not included in k's preferred delegation chain of the newly created tuple LD y , then k still delegates to guru h using the same delegation chain.
Proof. Assume DC(k) * x = DC(k) * y and i / ∈ DC(k) * y . In this case, we show that DC(k) * y can also be formed in LD x . We show this by discussing each property of the delegation chain definition for DC(k) * y in LD x :
(i) Agent k, in the delegating electorate of LD y , and guru h, in the casting electorate of LD y , are also in these electorates in LD x as only agent i has changed electorates. (ii) If there is not a repeating agent in DC(k) * y for LD y there will still not be a repeating agent in this chain in LD x . (iii) If the only agent casting a vote in DC(k) * y was DC(k) * y |DC(k) * y | then this holds true in LD x , as there was no change in the casting electorate between LD x and LD y . (iv) All of the edges to create delegation chain DC(k) * y that were available in G(R V + (i, V i )) are still available in G(R V ), as the only delegations that have been added are associated with agent i, and i is not in the chain DC(k) * y .
As we have satisfied all of Definition 7 for DC(k) * y in LD x and we know that i / ∈ DC(k) * y , then we can conclude DC(k) * x == DC(k) * y must hold (as the most desirable delegation chain for k exists in both LD x and LD y ), which contradicts the assumption.
The next Lemma shows that when agent i joins the delegating electorate in LD y and finds her guru to be j, any agent k who uses i in her preferred delegation chain DC(k) * y must also delegate her vote to guru j. This is because: (1) agent k cannot use a shorter chain (or same length chain with less weight) from i to a guru l = j, otherwise i would have chosen l as her guru; and (2) if k did not use the same chain from i to j due to agent e being an intermediator between i & j, as well as between k & i, then in this situation k does not need i in DC(k) * y because it would be a shorter delegation chain to go directly from k to e to the guru j.
Proof. Assume DC(i) * y = [i, ..., j] and ∃k ∈ V d where (k, A l ) ∈ D DF D (R A , G(R V + (i, V i ))) due to DC(k) * y = [k, ..., i, ..., l] and l = j. This would mean either:
(1) That [i, ..., l] satisfies Definition 9 and so [i, ..., l] should be i's most preferred delegation chain, which contradicts the assumption that DC(i) * y = [i, ..., j] is i's most preferred delegation chain; or (2) That k delegates to guru l because of a shared intermediary agent, i. As both possibilities lead to contradictions, the lemma is proven.
We can build on the previous two Lemma's to create our main Theorem:
Theorem 3. Given a Liquid Democracy tuple LD with a Breadth First Delegation rule D BF D ∈ LD and a voting rule F that satisfies cast participation, then guru participation is guaranteed to hold.
Proof. Lemma 1 shows that when an agent i joins the delegating electorate, if another agent k updates her preferred delegation chain, then k's new preferred delegation chain must include i. Lemma 2 shows that if an agent k includes i in its updated preferred delegation chain, then k must delegate her vote to the same guru that i delegated to. This means that if i joins the delegating electorate to delegate her vote to guru j, then j is the only guru that can gain more delegated votes. As F satisfies cast participation, we can see through Observation 1 that a Breadth First Delegation rule satisfies guru participation.
Related Work and Conclusions
How to handle preference relations over gurus has been an ongoing issue in the literature, as outlined by Brill (2018) . Our paper, through the delegation rule function, details a formalism to describe all types of ways delegations can occur. We have provided two delegation rule function instantiations, Depth First Delegation and Breadth First Delegation, the latter of which has the desirable property that every guru weakly prefers receiving a delegated vote. But there can exist many other possible delegation rules with potentially interesting properties, from the Markov chain delegation rule hinted at by Brill (2018) to a k-limited depth delegation rule (where an agent's vote is only allowed to travel a k depth away from it). A Breadth First Delegation rule as well as klimited depth delegation rule could counteract the fact that current liquid democracy implementations can suffer from a small subset of gurus possessing a large number of delegated votes (outlined by Kling et al. 2015) , as both rules favour keeping a delegated vote close to it's origin. This hypothesis should be followed up on.
Regarding other related work, there currently exists a lack of theoretical analysis on liquid democracy, but we will summarise this papers differences to the main undertaking so far. Firstly the work of Kahng, Mackenzie, and Procaccia (2018) finds that there is no decentralised liquid democracy delegation mechanism that is guaranteed to outperform direct democracy, when there are two alternatives and a ground truth on what is the correct alternative. Their delegation mechanism uses a graph of connected agents as input where each agent is labelled with the probability of knowing the ground truth and two agents are connected by an edge if they know each other. In comparison, our work only links an agent to another in a graph if they make the decision to nominate the other agent in their preference relation over gurus. This means that our graph is also applicable in domains where there is no ground truth (in these situations an agent would not want to delegate to a guru she knows just because that guru knows a lot about the subject -but instead the vote delegation could be motivated by shared values). Additionally our delegation rules can be used in a central or decentralised manner and so the negative result of direct democracy outperforming decentralised delegation mechanisms does not apply to this paper.
Another work is by Christoff and Grossi (2017) that positions liquid democracy within the theory of binary aggregation, focusing on two problems: (1) the existence of delegation cycles; and (2) inconsistencies that can occur when there are several binary issues to be voted on and a different delegate can be used for each issue. This paper resolves delegation cycles through in part (ii) of Definition. 7 which states that an agent cannot occur twice in a delegation chain. Additionally, individual rationality issues between multiple elections is out of scope for this paper. Finally, a special case of the model of Christoff and Grossi (2017) is introduced by Brill and Talmon (2018) , which allows a single agent to nominate several gurus to help define her preference relation over alternatives but our paper only focuses on one nominated guru per agent.
Finally, other interesting future work could include: (a) investigating guru participation with voting rules that do not satisfy cast participation; (b) relaxing the assumption that there must be strict preference orders over gurus; (c) defining and analysing other participation properties for liquid democracy.
